Running OS X doesnt mean running office.

It should be obvious that this is a version of OS X specifically tailored for the phone. Call it "OS X mobile" if you will.

Hopefully they will release mobile office apps for OS X mobile, but they didnt say anything about it yet...

For one thing, everything is touch screen driven, so all the interfaces would probably have to be redesigned (unless you want some half-assed apps)

I would say: Pricey.

Waiting for real reviews now. If its as easy and seemless as it looks, its just awesome...

but still pricey, and that's with a two year contract...

How much for an unlocked one, I wonder....

Each player has a different set of device keys.

Let says they revoke one device, on suspicion of being a hacked device.

The owner of this device might complain to Toshiba, Toshiba will say "Please send us your player back, we will investigate".

The owner will send them, along with name an address. Toshiba will receive the box, confirm that the problem is the blacklisted key, and say "We are sorry, you voided your warranty by opening the box, and also by adding those extra wires on the DRAM bus to connect your DRAM probe and still the keys".

And maybe the next day, the owner will be sued by the MPAA...

So more probably what will happen is that the hacker will not complain to Toshiba...

Obviously it could happen be that a key from an honest player is revoked by mistake. In this case the warranty would work, but that should not happen more often that any other break downs...hopefully...

No, sorry, there is no way you can "brute-force" the keys used in AACS in a few hours.

There are using 128 bits AES all over the place, and so far nobody is able to "brute-force" this in a few hours. Maybe the NSA can do it in a few weeks.

From a crypto stand point, AACS is sound. The specs are publically available, so you can go read them, and I'm sure a lot of cryptographer went to read them and as far as i know, nobody could find a fundamental issue that would break AACS apart.

The issues with AACS are all the key infrastructure: how to keep the device key secret, how to revoke keys etc...

HD-DVD players get the Device Key by buying them from AACS-LA. They are hiddent in the hardware or the software.

Each player has a different Device Key.

Keys can be revoked, meaning that they wont be able to decrypt new titles produced after revokation. This means that as soon as a key is published, it will be revoked.

Software players normally have Device Keys that expire and are renewed after a set time. This is presumably done because they cant hide thing in software as well as they do in hardware.

So software players and hackers are going to play cat and mouse for a while, the software company trying to hide the key better every time, and the hackers trying to find them out.

It is certainly going to be possible for a determined hacker to get the decrypted compressed video stream, but its not going to be as easy as CSS.

IE: dont expect standalone AACS ripper anytime soon. More likely you will see "Add-ons" for PC software players, and it will be difficult to make them work very reliably. Think of the PC software as a mine field, rather than a safe...