Roadrunner? Pfff, your chart-topping 1.105 petaflops are laughable. IBM just announced its 20-freaking-petaflop Sequoia supercomputer due for delivery by 2012. While supercomputer speeds have steadily increased year-over-year, a near 20x jump in calculations per second since the last world ranking is unheard of, even if the system has yet to come on-line. Slated to spend its life simulating nuclear explosions, Sequoia will use 45-nm (PowerPC, presumably) processors with 16 cores per chip for as many as 4,096 processors per rack. That's a total of 1.6 million cores assisted by 1.6 petabytes of memory. Perhaps all this processing power might help IBM understand the futility of its Lotus Notes strategy.

If you're American, it's nearly time to do your civic duty and pick the lesser of two evils for the greater good... and then to wonder if that vote actually got counted. With Diebold admitting its own machines are utterly insecure, competitor Sequoia is now under the microscope and, after a little quality time with the company's machines, Princeton researchers have filed a 158 page report on the ease of replacing their ROMs and winning yourself an election. Okay, we know what you're thinking: "Hacking hardware isn't exactly easy when the computer is in a locked box." Amazingly, it is. A researcher was able to bypass the physical security mechanisms in 13 seconds, despite never having picked a lock before. Now you're thinking: "But you'd need to do that on hundreds of them!" Not so; once infected that malicious code can spread itself to others, and, with no paper trail and an easily bypassed internal audit system, you're well on your way to whatever dark corner of Washington, D.C. you care to occupy!

[Via Ars Technica]

Voting machine makers scoffing at bad reviews? That's preposterous! Actually, it's not all that alarming to hear that Diebold, Hart InterCivic, and Sequoia Voting Systems all had less-than-amicable responses to a state study that "found that their machines could be breached by hackers." Of course, we're not exactly sure what all that groaning is about, as we've seen nothing but proof to back the investigation up. Nevertheless, Sequoia dubbed the review "an unrealistic, worst-case-scenario evaluation," Diebold kvetched that the study didn't look at its most recently developed software, Hart found "several inconsistencies, alternate conclusions, and errors," and Elections Systems & Software bypassed the rigmarole entirely by failing to provide their information to the secretary of state. Oh, the irony. [Warning: Read link requires subscription]

In an unprecedented attempt to shore up any possible flaws in its counties' electronic voting machines -- the same machines that have been examined and criticized nationwide on many occasions -- California will undertake a so-called "top-to-bottom" review of numerous systems from some half-a-dozen vendors, who must meet a set of seemingly rigid criteria if they want to receive certification for the 2008 election. Giving the proposed three-pronged approach -- initiated by Secretary of State Debra Bowen in collaboration with the University of California -- some real teeth is the fact that each of the three teams tasked with the actual work will be spearheaded by respected academics and leading private sector consultants, including none other than Princeton's Ed Felten, whose tireless efforts to expose the dangers of these shoddy machines are well known to readers of this site. Specifically, each system from manufacturers such as Sequoia, ES&S, and yes, everyone's favorite whipping boy Diebold will see a thorough review of their source code and documentation, along with what are being referred to as "red team penetration" attacks to test the terminals' hardware and software. Since companies are required to submit equipment for testing if they wish to partake in future elections, we could be seeing Diebold make the same begrudging exit from the Golden State as it did from North Carolina, for what we are not alone in suspecting is fear of exposing its flimsy code. Anyone who does choose to participate still risks being forced to make significant changes to their gear or perhaps even complete decertification, so when you Californians go to cast your votes in about eighteen months, don't be surprised if you have to mark up a piece of paper and drop it into a Equalivote-brand ballot box.

[Via Slashdot]

It's no secret that e-voting machines here in the US and around the world have more security holes than a slice of Lorraine Swiss, but it took a Princeton professor and $82 to discover just how bad the situation really is. Now, one would think that election officials would destroy their old terminals instead of selling them to the general public for practically nothing (the ~$5,000 devices are going for less than $20 apiece), yet that's exactly what Buncombe County, North Carolina did with 144 of its retired Sequoia AVC Advantages. First manufactured in the late 80's, the Advantages use old-school push buttons and lamps instead of the touchscreens found on more modern models -- and yet according to Princeton's Andrew Appel, they're actually more secure than those Diebold machines that fellow faculty member Ed Felten totally pwned several months back. Still, Appel and his students found numerous problems with these Sequoias that are still being used in parts of Colorado, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and all across Louisiana: not only were they able to pick the machines' locks in under seven seconds, they discovered that the non-soldered ROM chips were easily replaceable, allowing a hacker-in-the-know to potentially swap them out with outcome-altering data. A Sequoia spokesperson claims that any tampering with the machines would set off an alarm at their headquarters, but Appel argues that this security precaution could easily be overridden with the right code. So this is just great: now we know that a determined individual could easily pick up still-in-use machines (for a song), reverse engineer them to figure out the security roadblocks, and then sneak into a church basement or gymnasium where many of these terminals gather dust for 364 days a year. This is a big problem, folks, and let's hope it doesn't take an election Enron for some serious changes and regulations to be enacted by the feds.

There's an old adage in election-year politics: "Vote early, and vote often." While that second part is usually meant as a little humorous jab, Sequoia Voting Systems apparently wasn't in on the joke. See, in California and other states, some polling places have these e-voting devices (made by Sequoia) known as AVC Edge voting machines, and each machine comes with a yellow button located on the back of each device. The button is designed as a manual backup, which activists claim allows people to vote as many times as they like. Fear not, though: Sequoia will resubmit the system for certification (after the election), and doesn't really consider this button to be a flaw at all. As Michelle Shafer, vice president of communications for Sequoia, told internetnews.com: "It's a deliberate back-up feature to prevent the Edge from having a single point of failure -- an inoperable card activator -- at a polling location and preventing voters from casting their ballots." Plus, Shafer continued, even if someone did push the button, the machine issues a loud beep when it's pressed -- obviously a completely foolproof system. The California Secretary of State's office has already issued instructions to poll workers to listen for the fateful beeping, so voters can rest assured that no one will try this hack. Goodness knows what will happen if a bunch of voters come in with pagers that all go off simultaneously, though.

[Via TechDirt]