Diebold just can't seem to keep its nose clean these days. The nation's largest manufacturer of ATMs admitted not too long ago what everybody already knew: that their e-voting machines were totally bunk. Apparently in the course of that investigation it emerged that the company also thought it would be a laugh to load the open source Ghostscript Postscript interpreter software into those faulty machines without releasing its changes or paying the proprietary usage license fee -- leading Aritex, its developer, to file a lawsuit. It doesn't really instill confidence any further to hear that our nation's terrible electronic voting machines are running on stolen software, guys -- and to be honest, we're kinda starting to wish you'd get out of the ATM business, too.

For years, Diebold has embarrassed itself by claiming that obvious faults were actually not faults at all, and during the past decade or so, it mastered the act of pointing the finger. Now that it has ironically renamed itself Premier Election Solutions, it's finally coming clean. According to spokesman Chris Riggall, a "critical programming error that can cause votes to be dropped while being electronically transferred from memory cards to a central tallying point" has been part of the software for ten years. The flaw is on both optical scan and touchscreen machines, and while Mr. Riggall asserts that the logic error probably didn't ruin any elections (speaking of logic error...), the outfit's president has confessed to being "distressed" about the ordeal. More like "distressed" about the increasingly bleak future of his company.

[Via Techdirt]

Like California and Florida before it, habitual swing state Ohio has just issued a report slamming its three providers of electronic voting equipment -- including, of course, renamed Diebold -- and recommending that the 50 counties which use them scrap the machines in favor of a paper-trail-leaving optical scanning method. The report, commissioned by Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner, details the ways in which white hat hackers were able to infiltrate the systems, easily picking locks, using portable devices to manipulate vote counts, and even introducing "malignant software" into boards of election servers. Brunner's plan calls for the entire state's voting infrastructure to be overhauled by next year's presidential elections, a move likely to be lauded by touchscreen voting's many critics, but coming "about eight years too late, jerks -- thanks a lot," according to usually-even-tempered former candidate Al Gore.

According to an AP article released today, Diebold, one of the prominent makers of the recently embattled electronic voting machines, says that the company has failed to make its e-voting business profitable. If you'll recall, Diebold machines have repeatedly been the target of various hacks, many of which have proven the machine to be susceptible to intrusion from outside elements and thus unreliable from a security standpoint. The company has reduced its revenue outlook by $120 million, and has plans to allow its e-voting unit to operate more independently, giving the team its own board of directors and possibly a new management structure. To complete the overhaul of the ailing division, the company will also change the name of the branch from "Diebold Election Systems" to the starkly different "Premier Election Systems." Diebold blames the "rapidly evolving political uncertainties and controversies surrounding state and jurisdiction purchases of electronic voting systems," for much of its problems... as opposed to the fact that they currently produce faulty, unprotected, and unreliable machines.

Yeah, remember those white hats that took out three separate systems with ease in a California e-voting system security audit? Well what do you know, the eminently wise and honorable California Secretary of State Debra Bowen up and decided Friday that those severely vulnerable Diebold, Hart, and Sequoia voting terminals would still be cleared for takeoff, provided the companies in question supply their machines with updated firmware, disabled access to unused ports, kill the wireless connections, and so on. So basically, the companies that deny up and down their voting systems are even vulnerable are now directly responsible for making them less vulnerable per seemingly vague security-hardening guidelines. As usual, we suggest preempt these fools' garbage tech entirely and go low-fi on it: if you suspect your district is or will be using e-voting machines, send your votes by mail.

[Thanks, Daniel]

The fact that some individuals still have any level of faith left in Diebold is quite baffling, but in case you were looking for just one more episode to dash your hopes of a hack-proof voting machine, open wide. As fate would have it, a fresh study in Florida has found that even optical scan voting systems "can be hacked into," which is causing quite a bit of concern considering that touchscreen alternatives aren't exactly an option in the Sunshine State. Reportedly, the document noted that "official memory cards in the optical scan machines could easily be exchanged with ones altering the vote count," and it was also stated that Diebold must "deal with the flaws" by August 17th. Yeah, we're sure it's all over that.

[Thanks, Josh]

Voting machine makers scoffing at bad reviews? That's preposterous! Actually, it's not all that alarming to hear that Diebold, Hart InterCivic, and Sequoia Voting Systems all had less-than-amicable responses to a state study that "found that their machines could be breached by hackers." Of course, we're not exactly sure what all that groaning is about, as we've seen nothing but proof to back the investigation up. Nevertheless, Sequoia dubbed the review "an unrealistic, worst-case-scenario evaluation," Diebold kvetched that the study didn't look at its most recently developed software, Hart found "several inconsistencies, alternate conclusions, and errors," and Elections Systems & Software bypassed the rigmarole entirely by failing to provide their information to the secretary of state. Oh, the irony. [Warning: Read link requires subscription]

With all the chicanery that's been going on with ATMs of late, it looks like the machines are finally getting back at the humans. In a move that's already confusing creatures of habit, envelope-free ATMs are starting to pop up in highly-trafficked areas, and as the name implies, they require that your deposits not be stuffed into an envelope beforehand. Diebold, NCR, and, Wincor Nixdorf (among others) are beginning to roll out these newfangled machines, which cost some 20-percent more than typical ATMs and sport specialized scanners that can detect how much cash you're actually inserting as you slide your check / bills into its theoretical mouth. The biggest boon here is the drop in processing costs to banks, while customers are likely to be pleased with instant receipts and nearly-instant access to the fundage. 'Course, we're just counting down the days until yet another ATM trickster figures out how to convert a Hershey's wrapper into a $20 bill.

[Image courtesy of ABC]

In an unprecedented attempt to shore up any possible flaws in its counties' electronic voting machines -- the same machines that have been examined and criticized nationwide on many occasions -- California will undertake a so-called "top-to-bottom" review of numerous systems from some half-a-dozen vendors, who must meet a set of seemingly rigid criteria if they want to receive certification for the 2008 election. Giving the proposed three-pronged approach -- initiated by Secretary of State Debra Bowen in collaboration with the University of California -- some real teeth is the fact that each of the three teams tasked with the actual work will be spearheaded by respected academics and leading private sector consultants, including none other than Princeton's Ed Felten, whose tireless efforts to expose the dangers of these shoddy machines are well known to readers of this site. Specifically, each system from manufacturers such as Sequoia, ES&S, and yes, everyone's favorite whipping boy Diebold will see a thorough review of their source code and documentation, along with what are being referred to as "red team penetration" attacks to test the terminals' hardware and software. Since companies are required to submit equipment for testing if they wish to partake in future elections, we could be seeing Diebold make the same begrudging exit from the Golden State as it did from North Carolina, for what we are not alone in suspecting is fear of exposing its flimsy code. Anyone who does choose to participate still risks being forced to make significant changes to their gear or perhaps even complete decertification, so when you Californians go to cast your votes in about eighteen months, don't be surprised if you have to mark up a piece of paper and drop it into a Equalivote-brand ballot box.

[Via Slashdot]

Now we know that we're not supposed to take pleasure in the misfortunes of others, but when habitually-shady voting machine manufacturer Diebold loses a $9 million contract and starts whining about it in court, well, we think it's okay to make an exception. As the nation's leading election thrower e-voting provider, old Diebold thought that it was a shoo-in to win the Massachusetts Secretary of State's bid for 3,500 terminals for disabled voters -- and was so shocked when the contract was awarded to rival AutoMARK, that it's actually going to court to have the contract overturned or revisited at the very least. The company's completely immodest argument against the state and Secretary William Galvin basically boils down to this: "Since we've beaten AutoMARK for contracts all over the country, it only makes sense that we get this one too -- and because we didn't, there must be some cheating going on." For his part, Galvin calls the suit "frivolous" and claims that the best candidate did in fact win: disabled voters who tested all the machines reportedly formed a consensus around the AutoMARKs, and those machines have the added benefit of employing the same paper ballots as regular units, helping to ensure users' privacy. Despite the fact that it has "no hard evidence of unfair treatment," Diebold is nonetheless seeking an injunction on the use of its competitor's gear (some of which has already been delivered), or optimally, a complete reversal of the state's decision. No timetable on a decision yet, but when Diebold's forced to crawl back to Ohio with its tail between its legs, we'll let ya know.

[Via Slashdot]

Apparently executives high up at Diebold, the company that brought untold amounts of frustration to voters and countless faulty elections across the US, are considering dumping their Diebold Election Systems business unit, which it seems is almost systematically attempting to tarnish its parent company's brand with its infamous e-voting machines. After strained relationships with government officials over the utter craptasticality of their boxen, Diebold expects to announce the future of DES early this year; although there's no way to guarantee the 150k deployed Diebold machines would be decommissioned if DES were dismantled or sold, we'd really like to see a progressive technology organization -- like, say, a major university, the Open Voting Foundation, or the EFF -- raise the funds, buy the assets, opens source the software, and ensure that by the time the 2008 elections roll around, every vote will be properly accounted for, even if cast on old Diebold boxes.

You know, we could almost admire Diebold's "in face of all odds" kind of determination to ignore the haters and continue to assert that its e-voting machines are secure -- but this is just taking it too far. Alex Halderman, who was part of a team that discovered Diebold was using a rather standard sort of hotel mini-bar key to "secure" its machines from tampering, has pointed out that Diebold is showing vote-tampering wannabes just how it's done. Halderman and company refrained from posting images of the actual key, just to deter any casual voting hax0rs out there, but Diebold one-upped 'em all by posting pictures loud and proud of the keys on its own website. You have to be a Diebold account holder to actually buy one, but anyone could copy the key design from the pic -- which sounded like a great idea to Ross, who made three homemade keys based on the online pics, two of which worked to unlock the Diebold machine. Care to comment, Diebold? Oh, that's right, you're doing that whole quiet, dignified thing. As an aside, up to one-third of the e-voting machines which were used widely in the Brazilian elections in October last year showed signs of manipulation, with all sorts of number disparities and obvious fraud or malfunction. Those poor e-voting machines just can't catch a break. Check out a video of this latest Diebold hacking after the break.

Read - Diebold reveals e-voting keys
Read - E-vote fraud runs rampant in Brazil

If you thought that November 7th was the final day that you'd hear about e-voting zaniness, you'd be incorrect. While a myriad of states (and foreign locales) have had their bouts with Diebold and other electronic voting machines, the internet hunting state is now reporting an oddity of its own. Apparently, voters using machines built by Election Systems and Software in Williamson County, Texas showed up three separate times to legally cast their votes for the same candidate, or performed some sort of "human malfunction" in order to make the machines think so, anyway. While we're inclined to think that the actual machines were the culprit, the company still insists that some form of "user error" caused each vote placed to be counted three times. Although the triplicates did not skew the percentages of votes cast for each candidate, it still seemingly signifies an apparent flaw in the e-voting system, yet election officials were quoted as saying that they'd "review their training procedures" -- you know, so we can all work together to circumvent the problem.

[Via TechDirt]

With this being the first major election to see a significant portion of the population casting their ballots on electronic voting machines, you might expect some problems to arise with the notoriously buggy and untested technology -- and you'd be right. The New York Times is reporting that polling places across the country are experiencing difficulties with their voting equipment, and while we'd love to place the blame squarely on shady manufacturers like Diebold, Sequoia, and friends, it seems that the complications are actually due to human error as much as faulty hardware. According to The Times, Indiana appears to be the state having the most trouble today, with 75 precincts using incorrectly programmed smart cards and nearly half of Marion County's 914 precincts having trouble getting their machines to boot up in the first place. In New Jersey, meanwhile, Republican officials are claiming that Democratic Senator Robert Menendez's name was already lit up when some voters entered the booth, causing them to accidentally choose the wrong candidate. Other areas such as Cleveland, Ohio and Hartford, Connecticut were either unable to start their machines or found the touchscreens to be improperly displaying candidates' names, forcing election workers to move back to old-fashioned paper ballots.

The highlight of the day, though, has nothing to do with shoddy equipment and everything to do with a crazy voter who attacked a Diebold-brand machine in Allentown, Pennsylvania. Forty-three-year-old Robert Young, a registered independent, apparently believed that the e-voting machines had been deployed in a wild conspiracy by Republicans, and decided to make a statement by smashing the $5,000 device with a metal cat paperweight. A remorseful Young was quickly arrested by local police, and although the votes on the destroyed machine can still be saved, the feline paperweight did not fare nearly as well: officials have said that it will likely be impounded before being forcibly euthanized.

Read- Voting problems
Read- Cat-bearing voter

Considering the disaster that has been e-voting, we're not surprised to see another firm stepping forward with a slightly less complex alternative to confidently casting your ballot. Reverting back to the less problematic methods of paper-and-pencil voting, yet offering up a way to electronically store and track each vote, David Chaum and his research team have unveiled the Punchscan system to hopefully solve the world's e-voting woes. The cryptographic solution involves a double-sided ballot which is split into two halves using a hole punch, giving you one side to take home. The "receipt" reportedly doesn't disclose which candidate you voted for, and allows you to logon once home to verify that your vote was indeed cast, and cast for the intended party. So if you're worried that your hard-earned vote may be heading to File 13 rather than being counted, maybe you should start politicking to get Punchscan going in your neck of the woods, and if you're still confused about how this two-faced encryption dealio works, just peep the video, yeah?

[Via Slashdot]